Such a notion as this of
creative synthesis contradicts the logical implications contained in
the notion of parts. The notion of "parts" united by "creative
synthesis" is really a hybrid which attempts to combine the two
incompatible notions of logical distinction and duration. The result
is self-contradictory and this contradiction acts as a reminder
warning us against confusing the actual changing fact with the
abstractions in terms of which we describe it and so falling into the
mistake of taking it for granted that this changing fact must form a
series of distinct stages or things or events or qualities, which can
be repeated over and over again.
At the same time there is no getting away from the fact that this
changing fact lends itself to classification and that explanations in
terms of abstractions really do apply to it most successfully. We are
therefore faced with the necessity of finding some way of accounting
for this, other than by assuming that the facts which we know directly
consist of qualities which recur over and over again.
CHAPTER III
MATTER AND MEMORY
WE have seen that, according to the theory of change which is
fundamental for Bergson's philosophy, the changing fact which we know
directly is described as a process of becoming which does not contain
parts nor admit of repetitions.
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