"Considered in themselves" he says, "profound states of consciousness
have no relation to quantity: they are mingled in such a way that it
is impossible to say whether they are one or many, or indeed to
examine them from that point of view without distorting them." Now,
strictly speaking, of course, these "states of consciousness" ought
not to be referred to in the plural, it is, in fact, a contradiction
to speak of "states of consciousness" having "no relation to
quantity": a plurality must always form some quantity. This
contradiction is the natural consequence of attempting to put what is
non-logical into words. It would have been just as bad to have
referred to "the state of consciousness," in the singular, while at
the same time insisting that it contained resemblance and difference.
The fact is that plurality and unity, like distinct terms and external
relations, apply only to whatever has logical form, and Bergson's
whole point is to deny that the fact (or facts) directly known have
this form, and so that any of these notions apply to it (or them.)
This, of course, raises difficulties when we try to describe the facts
in words, since words stand for abstractions and carry their logical
implications.
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