" There was force in that. I agreed to it, and
authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct
understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval
experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their
freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that
support when the time arose.
As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in
prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the
Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I
consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted,
I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and
the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer.
That was the most I could do, and they authorized that, on the distinct
understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the
crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval
experts took place was later on--I think much later on, because that
crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance--but later on it
was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.
The Agadir crisis came--another Morocco crisis--and throughout that I
took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906.
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