The facts, however, have proved that the decision to make war
upon Germany had already been reached at that time.
The reason which impelled the Czar and his chief advisers to employ such
base tactics with the help of their word of honor and appeals to the
Supreme Being is plain. Russia requires a longer time for mobilization
than Germany. In order to offset this disadvantage, to deceive Germany
and to win a few days' start, the Russian Government stooped to a course
of conduct as to which there can be but one judgment among brave and
upright opponents. No one knew better than the Czar the German Emperor's
love of peace. This love of peace was reckoned upon in the whole
despicable game. Fortunately the plan was perceived on the German side
at the right time. Advices received by Germany's representative in St.
Petersburg concerning the actual Russian mobilization against Germany
moved him to add to the report given him upon the Russian word of honor
a statement of his own conviction that an attempt was obviously being
made to deceive him. We find also that the character of the Russian
operations had been rightly comprehended by so unimpeachable an organ as
the English Daily Graphic of Aug. 1, which said: "If the mobilization
order is also carried through in the provinces bordering on Germany, the
work of the preservers of peace is ended, for Germany will be compelled
to answer with the mobilization of her armed forces.
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