From 1887 on there had been no doubt that in the event of war with
France we should have to reckon also with Russia. This meant that the
army must be strong enough to be equal to the coming fight on two
borders--a tremendous demand upon the resources of a land when one
considers that a peaceful folk, devoted to agriculture, industry, and
trade, must live for decades in the constant expectation of being
obliged, be it tomorrow, be it in ten years, to fight for its life
against its two great military neighbors simultaneously. There are,
moreover, the great money expenditures, and also the burden of universal
military service, which, as is well known, requires every able-bodied
male German to serve a number of years with the colors, and later to
hold himself ready, first as a reservist, then as member of the
Landwehr, and finally as member of the Landsturm, to spring to arms at
the call of his supreme war lord, the German Emperor. A warlike,
militant nation would not long have endured such conditions, but would
have compelled a war and carried it through swiftly. As Bismarck said,
however, the German Army, since it is an army of the folk itself, is not
a weapon for frivolous aggression. Since the German Army, when it is
summoned to war, represents the whole German people, and since the whole
German people is peaceably disposed, it follows that the army can only
be a defensive organization.
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