This is
what Agnosticism asserts; and, in my opinion, it is all that is
essential to Agnosticism. That which Agnostics deny and repudiate, as
immoral, is the contrary doctrine, that there are propositions which
men ought to believe, without logically satisfactory evidence; and
that reprobation ought to attach to the profession of disbelief in
such inadequately supported propositions. The justification of the
Agnostic principle lies in the success which follows upon its
application, whether in the field of natural, or in that of civil,
history; and in the fact that, so far as these topics are concerned,
no sane man thinks of denying its validity.
Still speaking for myself, I add, that though Agnosticism is not, and
cannot be, a creed, except in so far as its general principle is
concerned; yet that the application of that principle results in the
denial of, or the suspension of judgment concerning, a number of
propositions respecting which our contemporary ecclesiastical
"gnostics" profess entire certainty. And, in so far as these
ecclesiastical persons can be justified in their old-established
custom (which many nowadays think more honoured in the breach than the
observance) of using opprobrious names to those who differ from them,
I fully admit their right to call me and those who think with me
"Infidels"; all I have ventured to urge is that they must not expect
us to speak of ourselves by that title.
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